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The monetary instrument problem is examined in an endowment 
economy model with various stochastic disturbances, with minimizing 
the variance of inflation as the policy objective. Following current 
developments in the theory of fiscal determination of the price level, 
active or passive fiscal policy is specified to guarantee a unique equi- 
librium for different monetary policies. The responses of inflation to 
various structural disturbances in the constant money growth rate- 
passive fiscal (the active monetary-passive fiscal regime, or the con- 
ventional regime where the Ricardian equivalence theorem and the 
Quantity Theory of Money hold) and the constant interest rate-active 
fiscal regime (the passive monetary-active fiscal regime, or the regime 
where fiscal policy determines the price level) are examined. The re- 
sults are explained based on the role of monetary and fiscal policies 
in financing government deficit changes and satisfying the govern- 
ment budget constraint in each regime, which is different from the 
explanations of past research following Poole.
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discussed, even before Poole’s (1970) formalization. In his survey article, 
Friedman (1989) explains the monetary instrument problem as follows.
The “instrument problem” of monetary policy arises because of the 
need to specify how the central bank will conduct its open market 
operations. In particular, the instrument problem is the choice of a 
variable to be set directly by the central bank via buying and selling 
securities, and hence the value of which is to serve as the principal 
guide in carrying out that buying and selling function ....
In this explanation, it is clear that not only the effects of the changes in 
money or interest rate but also the effects of the changes in government 
securities on the economy should be considered as a result of open market 
operation. 
However, past analyses following Poole (1970) consider only one side 
of open market operation, changes in money and interest rate.1 This is 
probably due to traditional analysis that simplifies the government bond 
market equilibrium by simplifying the consumer’s choice between govern- 
ment bond and money, or by disregarding the implication of the govern- 
ment budget constraint.
There have been recent theoretical developments following Aiyagari and 
Gertler (1985), Sims (1988, 1994), Leeper (1991), and Woodford (1995), 
which emphasize careful examination of the consumer’s government bond 
holdings and the government budget constraint. These studies assert that 
there are two equilibrium relations determining the price level― one is 
consistent with conventional models, and the other depends on fiscal 
policy. These studies incorporate the other side of open market opera- 
tions. Based on these studies, the current paper analyzes the role of fiscal 
policy in the choice between money and interest rate as the monetary 
instrument.  
Following Leeper (1991), monetary and fiscal policies are categorized 
as “active” or “passive.” The “active” policy authority sets policy variables 
without paying attention to the government budget constraint, whereas 
the “passive” policy authority has the burden of satisfying the govern- 
ment budget constraint. Only when one of monetary and fiscal policies 
is active (and the other is passive) is a unique equilibrium obtained. In 
particular, a constant money growth rate policy is categorized as an 
active monetary policy. Hence, a passive fiscal policy is necessary for a 
1 Some recent studies include Ahn and Jung (1991) and Kerr and King (1996).
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unique equilibrium; meanwhile, a constant interest rate policy is cate- 
gorized as a passive monetary policy so that an active fiscal policy is 
necessary.
Past research that did not explicitly specify fiscal policy and examine 
the implication of the government budget constraint proceeds in two 
ways. First, the interest rate pegging is claimed to lead to indeterminacy 
in the rational expectation model, for example, Sargent and Wallace 
(1975) and Smith (1988). Second, some special solution methods are used 
for the interest rate pegging, for example, Parkin (1978), McCallum (1981, 
1983), and Canzoneri et al. (1983). In contrast, by specifying different 
fiscal policies, the current paper compares the constant money growth 
rate and the constant interest rate policies in the model where a unique 
equilibrium is obtained,2 that is, the constant money growth rate-passive 
fiscal regime and the constant interest rate-active fiscal regime are com- 
pared. In general, this paper compares the active monetary-passive fiscal 
regime where monetary policy determines the price level as in conven- 
tional models, and the passive monetary-active fiscal regime where fiscal 
policy determines the price level as in the theory of fiscal determination 
of the price level.
To obtain analytic solutions, a simple structure of the model (an en- 
dowment economy model with the money-in-utility function framework) 
is assumed. Five kinds of structural disturbances are examined―money 
demand shocks, aggregate demand shocks (discount rate shocks), endow- 
ment shocks, monetary policy shocks, and fiscal policy shocks. The pro- 
duction side is simplified; thus, policy regimes are compared in terms 
of the variance of inflation, in contrast to Poole (1970), who assumes a 
fixed price level and compares policies in terms of the variance of out- 
put.3
2 Appendix 2 provides some connections between the present analysis and 
past research.
3 The utility function defined in the model may be explicitly used to evaluate 
the policy regimes. However, given that an endowment economy with flexible price 
is assumed, there are not many interesting welfare questions, and the welfare 
changes are minor. Thus, the variance of inflation, which often shows up in the 
policy literature as one objective, is used. In addition, the results in the present 
model are similar to those in Poole (1970) with the policy objective as minimizing 
the variance of inflation, when we use a conventional solution method, which 
does not take care of the government budget constraint. Therefore, the results in 
the present paper can be directly compared to those in Poole (1970). Refer to 
Appendix 2. In future research, it would be worthwhile to examine welfare im- 
plications, especially in the model with sticky price.
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When a fiscal policy is explicitly specified to guarantee a unique equi- 
librium for each monetary policy, Poole’s results and reasoning are not 
useful. The difference of the regimes results from the role of monetary 
and fiscal policy in financing government deficit and satisfying the gov- 
ernment budget constraint. Poole’s results and reasoning are restricted 
to the active monetary-passive fiscal regime; for example, a combination 
policy (using both interest rate and money growth rate) is not better than 
the constant interest rate policy in the passive monetary-active fiscal 
regime.
In addition, some interesting results are found. Using the result that 
the effects of passive policy on the contemporaneous inflation rate are 
almost null, we infer the following. (1) It is better for the authority with 
superior information on current disturbances and structural parameters 
and with less implementation errors to be active. (2) Only changes in the 
parameters of the active policy can generate the trade-off in reducing the 
variance of inflation in the presence of different structural disturbances.
Aside from the main objective of the current paper, as a by-product, 
this paper provides a careful examination of the dynamics of the passive 
monetary-active fiscal regime in the presence of different structural dis- 
turbances. It may be of separate interest to see how monetary and fiscal 
policies interact in response to different structural disturbances to satisfy 
the government budget constraint, and what effects are brought by dif- 
ferent structural disturbances in the passive monetary-active fiscal regime 
(or in the model of fiscal determination of the price level). For example, 
we provide a useful explanation and interpretation of an interesting find- 
ing of Kim (2004) for the passive monetary-active fiscal regime. In the 
passive monetary-active fiscal regime, an increase in the steady state 
real value of nominal government debt (bonds) reduces the variance of 
inflation in the presence of money demand and endowment shocks. In 
addition, we extend the results to a more general policy rule.  
Section 2 constructs the model and reviews the meaning of active and 
passive policies. Section 3 compares the constant money growth rate- 
passive fiscal and the constant interest rate-constant tax regimes. Section 
4 extends the analysis to general active monetary-passive fiscal and 
On the other hand, following the tradition of monetary regime comparison 
within general equilibrium models [for example, Sargent and Wallace (1982)], we 
compare a constant money growth rate rule and a constant interest rate rule, in 
contrast to studies following Poole (1970) that choose between money and inter- 
est rate. A similar result is obtained when constant money and constant interest 
rate rules are compared.
MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM REVISITED 529
passive monetary-active fiscal regimes. Section 5 concludes the paper 
with future research subjects.
II. The Model
A. The Structure of the Model
Each individual is endowed with an exogenous income each period. 
There is fiat money, and real money balance provides utility. For ana- 
lytical tractability, we assume a log utility function in which consum- 
ption and real money balance are separable. Each individual maximizes 
his lifetime utility subject to his intertemporal budget constraint. Income 
consists of endowments (Yt) and gross interest income receipts from one- 
period nominal government bond holdings (Rt－1 Bt－1/Pt, where Bt－1 is 
one-period nominal government bond holdings, Pt is the price level, and 
Rt－1 is the gross interest rate of the bonds). He allocates his income to 
consumption (Ct), changes in money holdings ((Mt－Mt－1)/Pt), and nom- 
inal government bond holdings after paying net lump-sum tax (transfer 
if negative) to the government (τ t). Each individual chooses Ct, Mt, and 
Bt, given Pt, Yt, τ t, Vt, Kt, and Rt
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where Mt≥0, Bt≥0, and Yt, Vt, and Kt are i.i.d. processes. 
The first order conditions for the consumer optimization problem are:
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Equation (2) is the money demand relation and Equation (3) is an inter- 
temporal version of the aggregate demand relation. Therefore, we can 
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interpret Vt as money demand shocks and Kt as a kind of aggregate 
demand shocks (or discount rate shocks). In response to a positive 
shock in K, each individual becomes less patient, and the demand for 
current consumption increases.
The government should satisfy the budget constraint. It issues debt 
and money and collects lump-sum (net) tax (or transfer if negative).
τ− −− −+ + =1 -1 1 0.t t t t t t
t t
M M B R B
P P                   
(4)
From the private budget constraint and the government budget con- 
straint, the social resource constraint is:
  
  Yt＝Ct.                                (5)
The monetary authority is assumed to control a combination of the 
growth rate of money and interest rate:4
α α ρ η+ = +
-1
t
m r t t
t
M R
M                         
(6)
where η t is an i.i.d process. αm＝1 and αr＝0 imply that the monetary 
authority fixes the money growth rate at ρ. On the other hand, αm＝0 
and αr＝1 imply that the monetary authority fixes the interest rate at ρ.
The fiscal authority sets the net tax level as a feedback rule from 
outstanding government bonds in real terms:5






P                           
(7)
4 Monetary policy is described as choosing a combination of the interest rate 
and the money growth rate, in order to examine the choice between them. This 
monetary policy can specify the complete region of active and passive monetary 
policy. Sims (1988) and Leeper (1991) describe monetary policy as interest rate 
setting rule in response to current inflation. Any combination of two variables 
among money growth rate, interest rate, and inflation can specify the complete 
region.
5 This fiscal policy rule, used by Sims (1988) and Leeper (1991) [similar rules 
are used in Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) and Sims (1994)], can describe the com- 
plete region of active and passive fiscal policy rule. Other fiscal policy rules, such 
as the AR-1 rule of net tax level, can also describe the complete region.
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where μ t is an i.i.d. process.
The disturbance terms in the monetary and fiscal policy rules (η t and 
μ t, respectively) are interpreted in two ways. First, they are interpreted 
as implementation errors. The effect of implementation errors on the econ- 
omy is also a standard for comparing different policy rules. Second, 
they are interpreted as discretionary policy. Under this interpretation, 
the effectiveness of discretionary policy in the presence of non-policy dis- 
turbances can be analyzed.
B. Steady State
By defining ht＝Mt/Mt－1, bt＝Bt/Pt, πt＝Pt/Pt－1, and mt＝Mt/Pt, the 
steady state relations follow.
π β=
R                                 
(8)
h＝π                                 (9)
−= − 11
YVm











                           
(11)
α α ρ+ =m rh R                            (12)
τ γ γ= +0 b                              (13)
By choosing different values of policy parameters (αm, αr, and ρ ), the 
monetary authority determines the steady state inflation rate. Under 
specific values of αm and αr, by choosing an appropriate steady state 
value of ρ, any inflation rate can be achieved.6
6 When the monetary authority fixes the money growth rate (αm＝1, αr＝0, and 
h＝ρ), the steady state inflation rate is ρ from Equation (9), R is determined 
from Equation (8), m and V are determined from Equation (10) given Y. In this 
case, fiscal policy determines only b and τ by choosing γ0 and γ. On the other 
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C. Specification of Fiscal Policies for the Unique Equilibrium
The model is linearized around the steady state. Using the steady state 
relations, the system of equations is summarized as:
π − − −− + = + − + −− − 1 1 1
1 1
( 1) ( 1)t t t t t t t t
h R R Y Y V V
R R           
(14)
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where each variable without subscript is the steady state value, and each 
variable with subscript is the deviation from the steady state divided by 
its steady state value (for both policy shocks, they are just deviations 
from the steady state values, not divided by their steady state values).7 
When the policy authorities set the policy parameters (αm, αr, ρ, γ0, and 
γ ) and the exogenous processes (Kt, Yt, Vt, ηt, and μt) are realized, ht, bt, 
πt, Ct (＝Yt), mt, and Rt are determined. The steady state nominal interest 
rate (R) is assumed to be greater than 1, which implies that the steady 
hand, in the case of the constant interest rate rule (αm＝0, αr＝1, and R＝ρ ), 
Equation (8) determines the steady state inflation rate (βρ). Note that even in the 
case of the constant interest rate rule, the fiscal authority cannot determine the 
steady state inflation rate. The fiscal authority only determines the steady state 
direct taxation and bonds.
Note that the monetary authority determines the steady state inflation tax on 
money holdings and seignorage. In contrast, from Equations (11) and (13), the 
fiscal authority determines the size of direct taxation. Inflation tax on bond hold- 
ings is determined from the steady state inflation rate set by the monetary 
authority and bond holdings, which can be controlled by the fiscal authority.
7 Equation (14), (15), and (17) can be expressed with mt instead of ht. I use ht 
to simplify the monetary policy Equation (17).
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state inflation rate (π ) and the steady state money growth rate (h) are 
greater than β from the steady state relations.8
In this system, there are two roots that can lie outside the unit circle, 
1/β－γ and hRαm/(hαm＋Rαr－R
2αr). Considering that this system in- 
cludes only one expectational term (Et－1πt), only one root should lie out- 
side the unit circle to have a unique equilibrium.9 The first root depends 
on the fiscal parameter γ , whereas the second root depends on monet- 
ary parameters αm and αr. When the first root lies outside the unit circle 
and the second root lies inside, the fiscal authority has the burden of 
keeping the government budget constraint satisfied by changing the net 
tax level in response to government deficit changes (active monetary- 
passive fiscal policy).10 On the other hand, when the first root lies in- 
side the unit circle and the second lies outside, the monetary authority 
satisfies the government budget constraint by changing the growth rate 
of money and by collecting seignorage and inflation tax (passive monetary- 
active fiscal policy). In the first case, the Quantity Theory of Money and 
Ricardian Equivalence hold as in conventional models, whereas in the 
second case, the inflation rate depends on the total government liabilities 
and fiscal policy.11
In contrast to past research on the monetary instrument problem, 
active or passive fiscal policy is specified to guarantee a unique equilib- 
rium under a particular monetary policy. First, a constant money growth 
8 First, it makes the steady state government bond and money holdings posi- 
tive [Equation (10)]. Second, when R is less than 1, the behavior of the system 
is unusual in the sense that the demand for (the growth rate of ) real money 
balance is an increasing function of the interest rate [from Equation (14)]. Third, 
we can interpret a money growth rate rule as an active monetary policy without 
reference to the steady state value (Refer to the next section).
9 This is the condition from Blanchard and Kahn (1980). In general, we need 
additional conditions found by Sims (1995). In the present model, the condition 
from Blanchard and Kahn (1980) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
unique equilibrium.
10 More precisely, the first root needs to be less than 1/β. When the first root 
is equal or greater than 1 and less than 1/β, real debt (and tax) explodes, but 
this equilibrium violates neither the transversality condition nor the feasibility 
condition. Refer to McCallum (1983) and Sims (1995). Here, I exclude this equi- 
librium for simplicity. Also, this equilibrium seems unrealistic. 
11 In the first case, the equilibrium inflation rate is determined from Equa- 
tions (14), (15), and (17) without referring to Equations (16) and (18). Equations 
(16) and (18) determine net tax level and the real government debt only. In 
contrast, in the second case, the equilibrium inflation rate is determined from 
Equations (15), (16), (17), and (18). Equation (14) determines the growth rate of 
money only.
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rate policy implies that the second root (R) lies outside the unit circle 
and the monetary authority cannot change the money growth rate to 
collect seignorage and inflation tax in response to government deficit 
shocks. In this case, to guarantee a unique equilibrium, fiscal policy 
should be passive, or the fiscal parameters should lie in the range of  
|1/β－γ|＜1 (the second root lies inside the unit circle), that is, fiscal 
policy should adjust net tax level enough to satisfy the government budget 
constraint in response to government deficit changes. 
However, in the case of a constant interest rate policy, active fiscal 
policy should be specified for a unique equilibrium. Given that the second 
root (0 since αm＝0) lies inside the unit circle, the first root should lie 
outside the unit circle to achieve a unique equilibrium (|1/β－γ|＞1), 
that is, fiscal policy does not sufficiently adjust so that the monetary 
authority should collect seignorage or inflation tax to satisfy the govern- 
ment budget constraint. 
III. Constant Money Growth Rate－Passive Fiscal Regime vs. 
Constant Interest Rate－Constant Tax Policy Regime
In this section, the constant money growth rate-passive fiscal and the 
constant interest rate-constant tax regimes are compared.12 I assume 
that the policy objective is minimizing the variance of inflation under dif- 
ferent sources of disturbances, given the steady state inflation rate.13 Five 
kinds of disturbances are considered―money demand shocks, aggregate 
demand shocks (discount rate shocks), endowment shocks, monetary 
policy shocks, and fiscal policy shocks.14 Finally, the policy authorities 
are assumed not to have information on the current disturbances, except 
12 The constant tax policy is chosen as the representative case of active fiscal 
policies because the constant tax policy implies that the fiscal authority does not 
change tax in response to government deficit changes. In addition, the solution 
is simple under the constant tax policy, compared to other active fiscal policies. 
In Section 4, more general forms of active fiscal policies are analyzed.
13 The mean of inflation rate (or steady state inflation rate) is not considered 
as a policy objective because both regimes (in general, any policy combination 
that can achieve a unique equilibrium in this model) can achieve any steady state 
inflation rate by adjusting the constant term (ρ). Refer to Section 2.B.
14 The optimal policy rule is not formally derived because the objective of the 
analysis is to reexamine the monetary instrument problem and Poole’s (1970) re- 
sults by considering the implication of government budget constraint and fiscal 
policy. Further major insights do not seem to be obtained by deriving optimal 
policy rule formally.
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for the case that monetary policy shocks and fiscal policy shocks are con- 
sidered as discretionary policy on current disturbances.15
A. Equilibrium
From the linearized system [Equations (14)-(18)], solutions are obtained 
following Sims (1995). The complete solutions in both regimes are re- 
ported in Appendix 2. In the case of the constant money growth rate- 
passive fiscal regime, the solution for inflation is:
( ) ( ) ( )π η− −⎛ ⎞= − − − − − + + −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1 1 -1
1 1 11t t t t t t t tV V Y Y K KR h R       
(19)
In this regime, the effects are the same as those in the conventional 
models in which the Quantity Theory of Money and the Ricardian equiv- 
alence theorem hold. A positive money demand and a positive endowment 
shock decrease the inflation rate, whereas a positive aggregate demand 
shock increases the inflation rate. In the next period, considering that the 
money growth rate and the steady state inflation are constant, the price 
level returns to the original growth path, that is, the absolute values of 
the first and second period inflation rates are the same, but they have op- 
posite signs. However, monetary policy shocks (money growth rate shocks) 
have only contemporaneous effects. In response to monetary policy shocks, 
the price level does not return to the original growth path in the second 
period because the money stock jumps from the original growth path. 
Notably, fiscal policy (neither fiscal policy shocks nor the steady state 
values of b, τ, γ0, and γ ) does not have any effects.16
15 In some cases, we do not discuss the lagged effects. If the policy authority 
is allowed to set up a feedback rule on lagged variables that offset the lagged ef- 
fects, then only contemporaneous effects matter. In addition, once no serial cor- 
relations of the structural disturbances are assumed, there are only a few cases 
where the lagged effects change the qualitative conclusion in the present ana- 
lysis. Therefore, in some cases where the lagged effects do not change the results 
greatly, we do not discuss the lagged effects.
16 The results are typically in the conventional model. Positive supply shocks 
like endowment shocks have a negative effect on inflation rate, whereas positive 
demand shocks like aggregate demand shocks have a positive effect. Positive 
money supply shocks have a positive effect on inflation rate, whereas positive 
money demand shocks have a negative effect on inflation rate. Fiscal policy shocks 
do not have any effect on inflation rate because it does not have effects on any 
variable except for fiscal variables. Refer to Appendix 1.
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In the case of the constant interest rate-constant tax regime, the so- 
lution for inflation is: 
       
β βπ β −
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ 1
( 1) ( 1)
t t t t
m R m RV Y Y
m bR m bR
 (20)
           
βη μ β⎛ ⎞+ − + −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠-1 -1
1
t t t t
R K K
R m bR
For this regime, detailed explanations are provided because the effects 
are different from those in conventional models. In response to a positive 
money demand shock (Vt), given the constant interest rate, the money 
growth rate and the real money balance [from Equation (14)] increase, 
and seignorage increases. Net tax is constant in this regime; thus, the 
monetary authority should offset the increase in seignorage by negative 
inflation tax to satisfy the government budget constraint. Therefore, the 
current inflation rate decreases. The size of the inflation rate decrease  
[{βm(R－1)}/(m＋bR)] depends on the steady state real balance (m) and 
the steady state real value of total nominal government liabilities or 
overall inflation tax base (money and gross interest payment of bonds, m
＋bR). The reason is that the real money balance determines the initial 
increase in seignorage, and the total government liabilities determine the 
amount of inflation tax that is collected by the inflation decrease. The 
larger the steady state real value of nominal government bond holdings 
is, the smaller are the changes in the inflation rate. 
A positive aggregate demand shock (Kt) increases the current inflation 
rate, which generates a positive inflation tax today. This increase in in- 
flation tax should be offset by negative inflation tax. Therefore, in the next 
period, there is a deflation.17 Note that the changes in the inflation rate 
(β ) do not depend on the size of nominal government liabilities. The reason 
is that the initial inflation is generated from the disturbance, not from 
the monetary reaction to a disturbance changing government deficit to 
collect inflation tax.
Endowment shocks (Yt) alter both goods market and money market 
equilibria; thus, the effects are the combination of the effects of a nega- 
tive aggregate demand and a positive money demand shock. 
Fiscal policy shocks affect the inflation rate contemporaneously. In re- 
17 Note that the discounted value of the deflation in the next period is equal 
to the current inflation.
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sponse to a positive net tax shock (μt), the monetary authority generates 
a deflation and collects a negative inflation tax [the size of which depends 
on the steady state real value of total government liabilities (m＋bR)] to 
satisfy the government budget constraint. Monetary policy shocks (ηt) have 
only lagged effects on the inflation rate. They alter only the composition 
of government liabilities (an increase in bond holdings and a decrease in 
the real money balance, caused by an increase in the nominal interest 
rate), but not the size of the total government liabilities, which determines 
the current inflation rate. In the next period, the inflation rate increases 
and inflation tax is collected to offset the increased debt service. The 
steady state government liabilities do not affect the size of the lagged in- 
flation change because both the inflation tax collection and the increased 
debt service are affected by the steady state government liabilities, and 
they are canceled out.
B. Comparison
In this section, two regimes are compared, with minimizing the variance 
of inflation as the policy objective. Table 1 (a) reports results when the 
steady state inflation rate is one (π＝1) and the steady state government 
bond holdings are zero (b＝0). Table 1 (b) reports general results. In each 
case, contemporaneous and lagged effects are reported separately. The 
first column shows the type of disturbances. The second and the fourth 
columns report the inflation responses in the constant money growth- 
passive fiscal and the constant interest rate-constant tax regimes, respect- 
ively. The third column under “rel. var.” compares the size of inflation 
responses (absolute values) in two regimes. “＞” (“＜”) implies that the 
inflation response is larger (smaller) in the constant money growth-passive 
fiscal regime than in the constant interest rate-constant tax regime. “b,” 
“π,” and “b, π ” in Table 1 (b) imply that the results depend on the steady 
state value of b, π, and both b and π, respectively.18
The effects of non-policy disturbances are examined first.19 When π＝
1 and b＝0, the contemporaneous effects on the inflation rate are the 
same in both regimes. However, in some sense, the constant interest 
18 When the structural shocks are assumed to be mutually and serially un- 
correlated, and the variance of each shock is normalized to 1, the sum of the 
squares of the coefficients on each shock (current and lagged) represents the 
variance of inflation rate due to each shock.
19 We skip the results on the endowment shocks because the inflation response 
in the presence of endowment shocks is the same as the one in the presence of 
both a negative aggregate demand and a positive money demand shock.
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TABLE 1
RESPONSES OF INFLATION (DEVIATION FROM THE STEADY STATE) TO 
STRUCTURAL SHOCKS
* The column under “rel. var.” compares the absolute value of the responses of 
the inflation rate (or the variance of the inflation rate) in the constant money 
growth rate-passive fiscal and the constant interest rate-constant tax regimes. 
“π,” “b,” and “π, b” imply that the relative size depends on π, b, or both π 
and b. b is non-negative. 
(a) π＝1, b＝0
1. Contemporaneous effects
























































































rate policy is better in the presence of money demand shocks, whereas 
the constant money growth rate policy is better in the presence of ag- 
gregate demand shocks, as in Poole (1970), although the reasoning is 
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different. The difference in two regimes results from different methods 
of financing government deficit changes.
First, in terms of the lagged effects, results are similar to those of Poole 
(1970). In the presence of aggregate demand (money demand) shocks, 
the lagged inflation response is smaller (larger) in the constant money 
growth rate-constant tax regime (the constant interest rate-active fiscal 
regime), and the constant money growth rate-constant tax regime (the 
constant interest rate-active fiscal regime) is better. In addition, in the 
presence of money demand shocks, the variance of inflation can be re- 
duced by non-zero steady state government bond holdings in the constant 
interest rate-constant tax regime, because non-zero steady state govern- 
ment bond holdings increase inflation tax base [shown in Table 1 (b) and 
Equation (20)].20,21 As discussed in the previous section, these differ- 
ences result from the different methods of financing government deficit 
changes in each regime.
Table 1 (b) shows that in general, which regime is better depends on 
the value of π or/and b. The effects in each regime depend on the steady 
state inflation rate.22 More interestingly, the effects in the constant inter- 
20 Note that the fiscal authority can choose different values of the steady state 
government bond holdings by choosing γ0 and γ. Refer to the steady state re- 
lations in Section 2.B and footnote 6.
21 We discuss how serial correlation of shocks (without any counter-cyclical 
policy on lagged effects) affects the results (when π and b are zero). In the con- 
stant money growth rate-passive fiscal regime, in response to non-monetary policy 
shocks, the price level returns to the original growth path in the next period. 
However, in the constant interest rate-constant tax regime, the price level does 
not. First, in the case of money demand shocks, the lagged effect is zero in the 
constant interest rate-constant tax regime. In this case, a negative (a high posi- 
tive) correlation of the shocks results in the relatively large reduction of the vari- 
ance of the inflation rate in the constant money growth rate-passive fiscal regime 
(the constant interest rate-constant tax regime). Second, in the case of aggregate 
demand shocks, the lagged effect becomes even larger than the current effect in 
the constant interest rate-constant tax regime. In this case, any serial correl- 
ation does not make the constant interest rate-constant tax regime better than 
the constant money growth rate-passive fiscal regime.
22 In the constant money growth rate-passive fiscal regime, as the steady state 
inflation rate (and the steady state nominal interest rate) increases, the interest 
rate elasticity of money demand decreases [Equation (14)]. Thus, the inflation rate 
changes more in response to money demand shocks. However, in response to 
aggregate demand shocks, the inflation rate changes less because less offsetting 
effects work as a result of the decrease in the interest rate elasticity of money 
demand. (A positive aggregate demand shock increases demand for current con- 
sumption; hence, the current inflation increases, but the current increase in in- 
flation is offset by an increase in the demand for real money balance due to the 
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est rate-constant tax regime depend on the steady state real value of 
nominal government bond holdings (We provide detailed explanations 
for this in the next section). Again, the difference between these two 
regimes results from the different methods of financing government deficit 
changes.
We can also compare these two regimes based on the effects of policy 
shocks. First, those shocks are interpreted as implementation errors, 
and we choose the regime that does not allow those errors to affect in- 
flation significantly. In the constant money growth rate-passive fiscal 
regime, implementation errors in fiscal policy do not affect the inflation 
rate. In the constant interest rate-constant tax regime, implementation 
errors in monetary policy have only lagged effects on inflation rate, which 
may be offset by fiscal discretion. Therefore, when there are implemen- 
tation errors in fiscal policy (monetary policy), the constant money growth 
rate-passive fiscal regime (the constant interest rate-constant tax regime) 
is better, that is, it is better for the authority with less implementation 
errors to be active.
Second, those shocks are interpreted as discretion or counter reactions 
to current disturbances under the assumption that policy authorities have 
some information on current disturbances and structural parameters.23 
Only the active policy can have contemporaneous effects on the inflation 
rate; hence, only the active authority can effectively perform discretion- 
ary policy against current disturbances. Even with current information 
on disturbances, the passive authority cannot reduce the variance of 
inflation. Therefore, if both policy authorities have current information 
on the disturbances and structural parameters but one has better infor- 
mation than the other, then it is better for the authority with better 
information to be active.
In summary, Poole’s (1970) basic results do not necessarily hold in 
increase in the demand for current consumption.)
In the constant interest rate-constant tax regime, as the steady state inflation 
rate increases, the elasticity of inflation with respect to the real money balance 
increases, and the inflation response increases in the presence of money de- 
mand shocks. [We can see this elasticity by transforming Equation (16) to an 
equation with mt instead of ht.]
Therefore, the fundamental difference between two regimes results from whether 
Equation (14) or Equation (16) is used to determine the price level, that is, from 
different methods of financing government deficit changes.
23 When both authorities have exact information on current disturbances (also 
if they know the structural parameters), then they can perfectly offset changes 
in inflation rate due to current disturbances.
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this model. Even when the results are similar, the reasoning is different: 
the results are based on the role of monetary and fiscal policies in financ- 
ing government deficit changes, and satisfying the government budget 
constraint in each regime. In addition, there are some interesting find- 
ings. First, it is better for the authority with superior information and 
less implementation errors to be active. Second, the variance of inflation 
depends on the steady state real value of nominal government debt 
(bonds) in the constant interest rate-constant tax regime. In the next 
section, the latter result is discussed in detail.
C. Nominal Government Debt (Bonds) Reduces the Variance of 
Inflation
In the constant interest rate-constant tax regime, an increase in the 
steady state real value of nominal government debt (bonds) reduces the 
variance of inflation in the presence of money demand shocks, endow- 
ment shocks, and fiscal policy shocks.24 This result is suggested by Kim 
(2004). In this section, we provide more explanations and implications on 
the result. Any shocks altering the present value of the government 
deficit are financed by inflation tax in this regime, which in turn depends 
on total nominal government liabilities. When nominal government bond 
holdings increase, the total nominal government liabilities increase, and 
the size of inflation required for collecting the given amount of inflation 
tax decreases. In Woodford’s (1995) terms, when there are larger nominal 
government liabilities, wealth effects from holding the government liabil- 
ities per change in the inflation rate become larger, and the size of 
changes in the inflation rate becomes smaller when there is a shock 
that needs a different level of equilibrium inflation rate.
We may then claim that larger steady state nominal government debt 
is better for reducing the variance of inflation because the steady state 
nominal government debt does not have any effects on the variance of 
24 When we interpret the fiscal policy shocks as implementation errors, if we 
assume that implementation errors become larger as the steady state tax level 
increases, then there may be an optimal size of nominal government debt (in the 
presence of fiscal policy implementation errors). The reason is that an increase 
in the steady state government debt decreases the variance of inflation through 
smaller inflation given the required inflation tax, but increases the variance of 
inflation through larger steady state government tax level and larger implemen- 
tation errors. For example, if we assume that the implementation errors (the size 
of fiscal policy shocks) are proportional to the steady state government tax level, 
then the optimal size of government debt is m(β R－1)/(R(1－β )).
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inflation in other cases (the constant interest rate-constant tax regime in 
the presence of aggregate demand shocks and monetary policy shocks, 
and the constant money growth rate-passive fiscal regime in the presence 
of any type of shocks).25
Some past research suggests that a large government deficit is respon- 
sible for high inflation when it is monetized or even when it is financed 
by government bonds. As Leeper (1991) emphasized, the distinction be- 
tween two policy regimes in the current paper is based on the method 
of financing deficit changes, that is, the marginal finance method, and 
25 The strategy of large steady state nominal government debt to reduce the 
variance of inflation may be especially valuable when policy authorities do not 
have an exact idea on the current regime or the nature of disturbances in the 
economy. Other strategies need some information on the nature of major distur- 
bances in the economy; if the information is imprecise, then there may be some 
costs. In contrast, this strategy works without any costs. In addition, this strat- 
egy does not require any knowledge on structural parameters. In other words, 
this strategy is not an empirical matter in the present model.
On the other hand, this result may serve as a favorable argument for non- 
indexed government bonds. If the government indexes some factions of bonds, 
then the policy authority cannot collect inflation tax from the indexed bond hold- 
ings. Therefore, in response to disturbances changing government deficits, larger 
changes in inflation are required, and the variance of inflation becomes larger. 
Bohn (1988) also provides a reason for non-indexation. Under the assumption 
that welfare losses from distortionary taxation are a convex function of the tax 
rate, a smooth path for tax rate changes or a smaller variance of tax rates is 
optimal. In the case of real shocks that increase government deficits and in- 
crease inflation, inflation tax compensates for the government deficits. The larger 
the nominal government bonds, the larger the inflation tax, the smaller the 
variance of direct tax, and the larger the welfare. Therefore, in his model, govern- 
ment nominal debt is a device for hedging. As he emphasized, his argument is 
based on distortionary taxation assumptions. 
In contrast, in the present analysis, even without the assumption of distor- 
tionary taxation, non-indexed government bonds can be better than indexed gov- 
ernment bonds. However, the distortionary direct taxation assumption may work 
as a counter argument against non-indexed bonds in the present model. As in 
Equations (11) and (13), larger steady sequation bond implies larger steady state 
direct taxation, and there may be some penalties or distortions when the steady 
state nominal government bonds increase. Therefore, in the model with distor- 
tionary direct taxation, the optimal size of government debt requires that the 
marginal costs of nominal government debt (from distortion) and the marginal 
benefit of nominal government debt (from reducing the variance of inflation) are 
equalized. In addition, as discussed in a previous footnote, if the implementation 
errors of fiscal policy increase as the size of steady state government direct tax- 
ation increases, then this increase in implementation errors will generate a larger 
variance of the inflation rate; thus, there will be another penalty incurred with a 
larger steady state nominal government debt.
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not based on the average level of finance. In the model, a negative μ t, 
and government deficit changes due to other structural shocks increase 
the inflation rate in the constant interest rate-constant tax regime be- 
cause the monetary authority finances the deficit changes by collecting 
inflation tax; however, the steady state inflation does not change, and 
the inflation rate increase is only temporary.26 On the average finance 
level, in the passive monetary-active fiscal regime, government deficits 
are already backed by seignorage and direct taxation.27 Therefore, the 
finding can be rephrased as: a larger nominal government debt is better 
for reducing the variance of inflation in the passive monetary-active fiscal 
regime when the government debt is fully backed.28
IV. Extension: Active Monetary-Passive Fiscal Regime vs. 
Passive Monetary-Active Fiscal Regime
This section extends the analysis to general comparison between the 
active monetary-passive fiscal regime and the passive monetary-active 
fiscal regime by allowing αm, αr, and γ to be non-zero. 
When non zero αr (1/(R(R－1))≥αr＞－1/R) is allowed, the inflation 
rate in the active monetary-passive fiscal regime (after normalizing αm 
as 1/h) is:
           
( ) ( ) ( )π α− −⎛ ⎞= − − − − − − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1 1
11 1t t t r t t tV V R V Y YR
               
( ) ( )η α+ + − − −-1
1 1t t t r tK K R KR
The relative effects of money demand shocks, and aggregate demand 
shocks change. There is a trade-off. By increasing the negative (positive) 
weight on interest rate, the variance of inflation due to money demand 
shocks decreases (increases), but the variance of inflation due to aggre- 
26 Remember that any steady state level of inflation can be achieved by dif- 
ferent values of ρ.
27 Refer to footnote 6.
28 Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) suggested that in the region of a particular type 
of active fiscal policy (their “non-Ricardian regime”), inflation rate and the price 
level are higher. The exact definition of their non-Ricardian regime is different from 
the definition of an active fiscal policy in the current paper. Again, any steady 
state inflation rate can be achieved in both regimes of the present analysis.
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gate demand shocks increases (decreases). The minimum variance in 
the presence of money demand shocks is achieved when αr is close to 
－1/R, whereas the minimum variance in the presence of aggregate de- 
mand shocks is achieved when αr is 1/(R(R－1)). We can derive the op- 
timal policy that reduces overall variance of inflation once the relative 
variance of each shock is specified. The result is consistent with Poole 
(1970), in the sense that a combination policy (using both interest rate 
and money growth rate) dominates the pure interest rate pegging or the 
pure money (growth rate) pegging. Additionally, note that the fiscal par- 
ameters and fiscal policy shocks still do not have any effect on the in- 
flation rate in this regime.
In the case of the passive monetary-active fiscal regime, we report the 
result from allowing either non-zero αm or non-zero γ, but not both be- 
cause the solution is very complicated when both parameters are allowed 
to be non-zero, and some basic intuitions can be obtained without doing 
that. 
When non-zero αm((R－1)/(h(R＋1))≥αm≥－1/h) is allowed, the infla- 
tion rate in the passive monetary-active fiscal regime (after normalizing 
αr as 1/R) is:
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The current effect of each shock on the inflation rate is exactly the 
same as in the constant interest rate policy case, and αm does not affect 
contemporaneous inflation at all. Therefore, in terms of the contempor- 
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aneous response of the inflation rate, we do not observe any trade-offs 
by changing αm, and a combination policy is not better than the pure 
interest rate pegging, which is different from the results of Poole (1970).29
On the other hand, as in the constant interest rate-constant tax regime, 
an increase in the steady state nominal government debt decreases the 
variance of the inflation rate in this regime, regardless of the value of 
αm. In addition, monetary policy shocks still have only delayed effects 
on inflation rate.
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Changes in the fiscal parameter γ generate the trade-off between re- 
ducing the variance of inflation due to money demand shocks and reduc- 
ing the variance of inflation due to aggregate demand shocks. Moreover, 
by allowing non-zero γ, the variance of inflation may be reduced.30 In 
29 There are prolonged lagged effects of disturbances on the inflation rate. 
Hence, even in terms of lagged responses of the inflation rate, the pure interest 
rate pegging dominates the combination policy. The reason for the delayed effects 
is that the monetary authority still collects the same size of inflation tax in the 
current period, which needs the same size of inflation and the same size of the 
increase in the growth rate of money. Considering that the monetary authority 
controls only the combination of money growth rate and interest rate, the interest 
rate also changes. This change in the interest rate changes the debt service next 
period, and it is financed by inflation tax in the next period, which changes the 
debt service in the following period and so on.
30 For example, when 1/β－1＞γ＞0, parts of the government deficit shocks are 
financed by direct tax in the next period. As a result, in response to money 
demand shocks, the amount of necessary inflation tax decreases, and variance 
of inflation decreases. In contrast, in the case of aggregate demand shocks, the 
variance of inflation increases. In response to aggregate demand shocks, real bond 
holdings decrease, which leads to direct tax decreases in the next period. There- 
fore, to offset the next period direct tax decrease, the increase in the current in- 
flation should be larger than the previous case. When 1/β－γ is close to 1/(Rβ ), 
the variance due to money demand shocks is minimized. As |1/β－γ | increases, 
the variance due to aggregate demand shocks and endowment shocks becomes 
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the passive monetary-active fiscal regime, there is neither a trade-off nor 
the possibility of reducing the inflation rate when monetary parameters 
are changed. However, there is a trade-off and a possibility when fiscal 
parameters are changed. 
Additionally, as in the previous case, an increase in the steady state 
nominal government debt decreases the variance of the inflation rate, 
regardless of the value of γ. On the other hand, monetary policy shocks 
have current effects on the inflation rate, but the discretionary monetary 
policy offsetting the effects of current disturbances is still not simple. It 
requires the exact information on fiscal policy parameter γ, in addition 
to the information on disturbances and other structural parameters. In 
particular, the sign of the inflation rate response to monetary policy 
shocks is sensitive to γ. When the fiscal authority sets γ close to zero 
but the monetary authority is unsure of the sign of γ, the monetary au- 
thority cannot perform the appropriate discretionary policy even with 
the precise knowledge of the nature and size of current disturbances and 
other structural parameters.
In summary, previous findings can be generalized. First, the difference 
of two regimes results from the role of monetary and fiscal policies in 
financing the government deficit changes and satisfying the government 
budget constraint. Second, an increase in the steady state real value of 
the nominal government bonds decreases the variance of the inflation 
rate in the passive monetary-active fiscal regime. Third, it is better for 
the policy authority with better information and with less implementation 
errors to be active. In addition, there is a new finding―a combination 
policy is better than the pure interest rate or the pure money growth 
rate pegging in the active monetary-passive fiscal regime, but not in the 
passive monetary-active fiscal regime. Poole’s (1970) results and reasoning 
hold only in the active monetary-passive fiscal regime, but not in the 
passive monetary-active fiscal regime.
V. Conclusion
By constructing an endowment economy model with various stochastic 
disturbances, which specifies fiscal policy explicitly to guarantee a unique 
equilibrium, the monetary instrument problem is examined, with mini- 
mizing the variance of inflation as the policy objective. As in Poole (1970), 
which regime is better depends on the nature of disturbances, and the 
smaller.
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choice of the optimal policy regime is an empirical matter. However, 
Poole’s (1970) exact results and reasoning do not apply, especially in 
the passive monetary-active fiscal regime. The differences in inflation 
responses in different regimes should be explained by the role of mon- 
etary and fiscal policies in financing the government deficit changes 
and satisfying the government budget constraint in each regime.
(Received 7 April 2010; Revised 7 April 2011; Accepted 9 April 2011)
Appendix 1. Solutions
1) Constant Money Growth Rate Policy-Passive Fiscal Regime
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Appendix 2. Minimum State Variable Solution
The result of the current paper is compared to the minimum state vari- 
able solution. McCallum (1983) suggested the “minimum state variable” 
or “bubble-free” solution that is driven by the “fundamental” (but ignoring 
the government budget constraint and fiscal policy). In the present model, 
the solution can be obtained by assuming that the expected value of 
money (or the price level) is fixed in every period, that is, EtMt＋1＝M (or 
EtPt＋1＝P). The solution for the inflation rate in this case is: 
π − −= − − + −1 1( ) ( )t t t t tY Y K K
We can see that Poole’s basic result holds by comparing the above equa- 
tion with Equation (19) under the constant money growth rate rule, that 
is, the constant money growth rate regime is better in the case of aggre- 
gate demand disturbances whereas the constant interest rate regime is 
better in the case of money demand shocks.
However, to fix the expected value of money (Et Mt＋1＝M ), the fiscal 
authority should keep the following rule.




From the viewpoint of the current analysis, using a minimum state vari- 
able solution is equivalent to implicitly assuming a specific fiscal policy.
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